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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
This is a new section in the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. Presented
below are the case histories of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
which were discussed in the Fourth (September 1, 1976 through August
31,1977) and Fifth (September 1, 1977 through August 31, 1978) surveys and
which sought Supreme Court review.
I. SUPREME COURT REVERSALS
A. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin
In Harrah Independent School Distrit v. Martt' I the Supreme Court re-
versed a 1978 decision of the Tenth Circuit2 involving the dismissal of an
Oklahoma school teacher who claimed a violation of due process and equal
protection.
The Oklahoma school district did not renew the tenured teacher's con-
tract claiming she willfully neglected her duty.3 The respondent's contract
required teachers holding only a bachelor's degree to earn five semester
hours of credit every three years. In 1969, when respondent was hired, the
sanction for noncompliance with the continuing education requirement was
the withholding of salary increases. Respondent refused to comply with the
requirement and forfeited salary increases through the school year 1973-
1974. In 1973 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a law mandating salary
increases for teachers regardless of compliance with the continuing educa-
tion program. The school board then notified the respondent that continued
noncompliance would result in the nonrenewal of her contract. Respondent
appeared before the school board in January 1974 and indicated she would
not comply with the requirements of her contract. In April 1974 the school
board voted not to renew the teacher's contract.
4
Respondent unsuccessfully sought administrative relief and judicial re-
lief in the state courts before bringing her action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma claiming she had been denied
her liberty and property without due process of law and equal protection of
the laws.5 The District Court dismissed the complaint and respondent ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding there had
been a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
6
1. 99 S. Ct. 1062 (1979).
2. Martin v. Harrah Independent School Dist., 579 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1978). For a
discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case, see Consttiutional Law, Fifth Annual Tenth
Circuit Surv, 56 DEN. L.J. 417, 422-24 (1979).
3. Oklahoma's tenure statute provided that "willful neglect of duty" was grounds for
nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's contract. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 6-122 (West Supp.
1973).
4. 99 S. Ct. 1063.
5. Id.
6. 579 F.2d 1199.
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Reversing, the Supreme Court dealt briefly with the procedural due
process issue holding that respondent had been afforded all necessary proce-
dural due process by having the opportunity to appear with counsel before
the school board to contest the board's determination. 7 Turning to the four-
teenth amendment claims, the Court found no substantive due process viola-
tion because respondent's claim did not involve freedom of choice with
respect to "basic matters."
'8
The Supreme Court stated that the Tenth Circuit mistakenly relied on
the equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth amendment. Since no sus-
pect classification or deprivation of fundamental constitutional right was al-
leged, the rational basis test was the standard to be applied and the agreed
facts showed that the school board's action was rationally related to a state
objective and the respondent was not singled out for special treatment. 9
Mary H. Hurley
B. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs,I the Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's decision in McCombs v. Federal Energy Regulatoy CommIsszon,
2
which had held that "abandonment" within the meaning of Section 7(b) of
the Natural Gas Act (Act) 3 did not require formal approval by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly the Federal Power Commission,
hereinafter FPC).
Certificates of convenience and necessity had been issued by the FPC in
1954 and 1963 to McCombs' predecessors, allowing them to sell natural gas
to United Gas Pipe Line Company (United). In 1966 the producer notified
United and the FPC that the gas well was depleted, and no further gas sales
were made to United from the tract. McCombs subsequently obtained as-
signment of the gas tract lease and in 1972 discovered new gas reserves in the
same tract, though at different and deeper drilling sites. He then contracted
to sell this newly discovered natural gas to E. I. duPont de Nemours and
Company in intrastate commerce.
United, upon learning of the new gas discovery and McCombs' inten-
tion to sell it to a third party, filed a complaint with the FPC asserting its
right to the gas. The FPC upheld the administrative law judge's decision
that the certificates issued to McCombs' predecessors in interest were for the
entire amount of natural gas in the tract, including the newly discovered
reserves. 4 The FPC declared that McCombs' attempt to sell the gas to an-
7. 99 S. Ct. 1064.
8. Id. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) as to "basic matters of procrea-
tion, marriage, and family life.")
9. Id. at 1064-65.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2461 (1979).
2. 576 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see
Lands and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Cirtuit Survey, 56 DEN. L.J. 517, 531-34 (1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2465.
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other intrastate party violated the Act and ordered McCombs to deliver all
gas produced on the tract to United.
McCombs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asking the court to set aside
the order. The Tenth Circuit reversed the FPC, reasoning that the depletion
of the original well, the removal by United of all its metering equipment at
the site, and the lack of production or sale of natural gas to United for sev-
eral years constituted "abandonment" in fact. 5 The Tenth Circuit also
noted that two letters by the FPC to the lessees of the tract, suggesting that
the lessees apply for abandonment approval, were tacit admissions by the
FPC that abandonment had occurred and that it need only be formalized
for the record.
6
In rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court pointed
to the language in the original 1953 sale agreement which stated that all
"merchantable natural gas . ..now or hereafter" produced from the tract
would be sold to United. The Court further noted that there was no time
limitation on either of the certificates granted by the FPC and that United,
at the time of removal of its metering equipment from the original site in
1966, had stated it would reinstall the equipment, "if at some future date,
you have further gas to deliver to us at the above delivery point, which will
be subject to the terms of the above-captioned contract."
7
The point on which the case turned was the explicit and clear language
of Section 7(b) of the Act, which states that, "No natural-gas company shall
abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after
due hearing, . . .."8 The Court found this language did not permit a "de
facto" abandonment or a tacit approval of abandonment by the FPC. Mc-
Combs' predecessors had twice ignored letters from the FPC warning them
that no abandonment application had been made. Absent the application
and the statutorily required hearing, there could be no abandonment within
the provisions of the Act. 9
The Court also pointed to its own language concerning abandonment
proceedings in Sunray Mid-Contihent Oil Co. v. FPC,i° in which it stated: "[I]f
the companies, failing to find new sources of gas supply, desired to abandon
service because of a depletion of supply, they would have to make proof
thereof before the Commission under § 7(b). '" I The Court held that, under
the clear language of Section 7(b) and its own interpretation of this language
in Sunray, there could be no abandonment of a natural gas field without a
proper hearing before the Commission and specific FPC approval. The orig-
5. 570 F.2d at 1382.
6. Id. at 1379.
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2464.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2464, 2466.
10. 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
11. Id. at 158 n.25.
19801
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inal FPC decision was reinstated.12
Steve Brown
C. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth
Circuit decision 2 that held Congress had impliedly reserved easements for
access to public domain sections of land in a land grant 3 to the Union Pacific
Railroad.
4
Petitioners were successors-in-interest to Union Pacific sections in Wyo-
ming. Because of the "checkerboard" scheme of the Union Pacific grant, it
was impossible for members of the public to enter a section of recreationally-
improved public domain land, which interlocked petitioners' sections, with-
out entering petitioners' land. After negotiations for public access over peti-
tioners' land failed, the Government cleared a road cutting across the corner
of one of petitioners' sections and invited the public to use the road for access
to the public land. Petitioners brought an action to quiet title against the
Government as to the section corner burdened by the road, and the Wyo-
ming District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment.5
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress must have im-
pliedly reserved easements permitting access to public domain sections when
granting lands to the Union Pacific because "[t]o hold to the contrary would
be to ascribe to Congress a degree of carelessness or lack of foresight which
• . . would be unwarranted."'6 The dissent argued that the Government's
failure to assert easements for 110 years constituted a persuasive administra-
tive construction of the Union Pacific grant which should be accorded great
weight, and that the majority had misanalyzed the case by not recognizing
the key issue - "whether the United States may take theprivate land for access
purposes without compensation."
'7
Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court initially held that the
common law easement by necessity for which the Government had argued
was conceptually precluded. The doctrine of easements by necessity inher-
ently focuses on necessity at the date that a land grant is made. Since the
public land was unimproved in 1862, the doctrine did not, at that time,
reserve an easement for public recreational access and could not, in 1977,
12. 99 S. Ct. at 2470.
1. 99 S. Ct. 1403 (1979).
2. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1977). For discussion of the
Tenth Circuit's opinion, see Lands and Natural Resources, Fourth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 55 DEN.
L.J. 535, 538-39 (1978).
3. Act ofJuly 1, 1862, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 489-92, as amended, Act ofJuly 2, 1864, § 4, 13 Stat.
358.
4. 570 F.2d at 885.
5. 99 S. Ct. at 1409.
6. 570 F.2d at 885.
7. Id. at 889-90 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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retroactively reserve an easement.8 The Court additionally found the doc-
trine inapplicable because the Government's power of eminent domain pre-
cludes the existence of any "necessity" on the facts.9
After disposing of the argument for an easement by necessity, the Court
focused on the congressional intent underlying the Union Pacific grant. The
Court noted initially that the grant contained explicit reservations in favor
of the United States and its grantees, and that it would be anomalous for the
same Congress that had scrupulously carved specific exceptions out of the
grant to have knowingly intended for access easements to be reserved by
mere implication. The Court then stressed that, since the purpose of the
grant was to induce the grantee to risk a great amount of capital in con-
structing a vital public improvement, the rule of construction favoring the
Government as grantor could not be applied "in its full vigor" to the Union
Pacific grant. Rather, the grant was to receive a "more liberal construc-
tion."' 0 Under this liberal approach, the Court refused to devine any intent
to reserve easements from the passage of the Unlawful Inclosures Act. ' ' Fur-
thermore, the Court held Camfield v. United States' 2 inapplicable as being
predicated on a "nuisance" rationale not present in Leo Sheep.' 3
In conclusion, the Court discussed the unprecedented nature of the
Government's claim and the longstanding administrative construction of the
grant which was adverse to the existence of an implied reservation. ' 4 Given
the dearth of substance in the Government's intent argument, the Court
opted for fostering security of titles rather than an "ill-defined power to con-
struct public thoroughfares without compensation."' 5
David C Halford
D. United States v. Rutherford
In United States v. Rutherford,' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Cir-
cuit opinion2 and upheld the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
agency's latest battle with supporters of the cancer drug laetrile.
The legal controversy has focused on whether laetrile is a "new drug"
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 3 The
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1410. For an analogous rationale, see United States v. New Mexico, 98 S.
Ct. 3012 (1978), holding that an "implied reservation" of water for a national forest is limited in
scope by the purposes for which the forest was segregated from the public domain.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1410.
10. Id. at 1411 (citing United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry., 150 U.S. I, 14 (1893)).
!1. Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 321, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-66.
12. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
14. Id. at 1413.
15. Id. at 1413-14.
I. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
2. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976). This section defines a new drug as one that experts
"qualified by scientific training and experience" do not generally recognize as safe and effective.
19801
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FDA classified laetrile as "new" and maintained that it was to be excluded
from interstate commerce.
4
When the dispute initially reached the Tenth Circuit, the court upheld
a district court injunction against the FDA on the grounds that the agency
had classified laetrile without making any formal findings. 5 The court of
appeals remanded and ordered the FDA to develop an administrative rec-
ord. After hearings, the FDA again concluded that laetrile was not generally
recognized as safe and effective, and was therefore a new drug.
6
Rutherford v. United States came before the Tenth Circuit 7 a second time
on appeal from a decision of the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma which vacated the FDA ruling.8 The district court held: 1) the
FDA's findings that laetrile was not exempt under the "1962 grandfather
clause" 9 was arbitrary and capricious; t O and 2) prohibiting terminally ill
cancer patients from using laetrile was an unconstitutional invasion of pri-
vacy. I I
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit again upheld an injunction against the
FDA, but did not consider the district court's grounds. Instead, the decision
of the court of appeals was based on the inapplicability of the "safe and
effective" standard of the Act' 2 to laetrile use by terminally ill individuals.
Chief Judge Seth, for the Tenth Circuit, held that "safe and effective" had
no meaning for cancer patients who would die regardless of treatment.
13
In United States v. Rutherford,14 the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
found effectiveness was not limited to the capacity to cure. "[A] drug is ef-
fective if it fulfills . . . its sponsor's claims of prolonged life, improved physi-
cal condition, or reduced pain."' 15 Similarly, the Court found "a drug is
unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by
the possibility of therapeutic benefit."'
16
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the clear
language of the statute and the legislative history indicated no special provi-
sions were intended for the terminally ill. 17 His opinion noted that, rather,
Congress intended that the FDA protect individuals with fatal illnesses from
fraudulent cures.18 In addition, the Court commented that an ineffective
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976) prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of any
new drug unless an application filed with the FDA, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 355(b), is approved.
5. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976). This decision is discussed
in Admi)nistratie Law, Fourth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 55 DEN. L.J. 391, 392-95 (1978).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
9. The Drug Amendments of 1962 provided that drugs which were marketed before Oc-
tober 10, 1962 and which were generally recognized as safe were exempt from the "new drug"
test of 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1). 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (note).
10. 438 F. Supp. at 1295.
11. Id. at 1299-1301.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976).
13. 582 F.2d at 1237.
14. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
15. d. at 2477.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2475-76.
18. Id. at 2475.
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drug could be particularly unsafe for patients with potentially fatal diseases
if it caused them to reject conventional treatment. 9
The laetrile controversy, however, has not yet reached a final resolution.
The case was remanded to the Tenth Circuit for consideration of the consti-
tutional and grandfather clause questions raised in the district court.
20
SqTmour Joseph
II. DENIALS OF CERTIORARI
A. Cases from Fourth
Annual Survey Tenth Circuit Citation Certiorari Denied
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co.
Doe v. Pringle




G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States
Harr v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board
Harr v. Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n
Los Alamos School Board v.
Wugalter




Pacific Engineering & Production
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
Staton v. Mayers
United States v. Allen
United States v. Brinklow
United States v. Davis
United States v. Evans
United States v. Fairfax
United States v. Gunter
United States v. Munz
United States v. Nolan
United States v. Plum
United States v. Rosenfeld
United States v. Shoemaker
United States v. Sor-Lokken
United States v. Walton
Utah State University of Agricul-
ture & Applied Science v. Bear,
Stearns & Co.
554 F.2d 381 (1977)
550 F.2d 596 (1976)
552 F.2d 370 (1977)
562 F.2d 1188 (1977)
551 F.2d 1182 (1977)
560 F.2d 1011 (1977)
557 F.2d 747 (1977)
557 F.2d 571 (1977)
557 F.2d 709 (1977)
548 F.2d 295 (1977)
554 F.2d 423 (1977)
541 F.2d 249 (1976)
542 F.2d 825 (1976)
551 F.2d 790 (1977)
552 F.2d 908 (1977)
554 F.2d 398 (1977)
560 F.2d 1003 (1977)
544 F.2d 1056 (1976)
542 F.2d 805 (1976)
No. 77-1055
(July 28, 1977)
546 F.2d 861 (1976)
542 F.2d 1382 (1976)
551 F.2d 266 (1977)
558 F.2d 568 (1977)
545 F.2d 98 (1976)
542 F.2d 561 (1976)
557 F.2d 755 (1977)
552 F.2d 1354 (1977)
549 F.2d 164 (1977)
434 U.S. 921 (1977)
431 U.S. 916 (1977)
434 U.S. 835 (1977)
435 U.S. 994 (1978)
434 U.S. 845 (1977)
435 U.S. 923 (1978)
434 U.S. 1033 (1978)
434 U.S. 1033 (1978)
434 U.S. 968 (1977)
431 U.S. 967 (1977)
434 U.S. 905 (1977)
430 U.S. 933 (1977)
429 U.S. 1049 (1977)
434 U.S. 879 (1977)
434 U.S. 907 (1977)
434 U.S. 836 (1977)
434 U.S. 1047 (1978)
436 U.S. 930 (1978)
429 U.S. 1101 (1977)
certiorari denied
October 3, 1977
431 U.S. 920 (1977)
429 U.S. 1104 (1977)
434 U.S. 904 (1977)
certiorari denied-cita-
tion not yet available
430 U.S. 941 (1977)
429 U.S. 1004 (1976)
434 U.S. 894 (1977)
431 U.S. 959 (1977)
434 U.S. 890 (1977)
Further Developments:
Unified School District No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 948
(1978). The case was remanded to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
19. Id. at 2477.
20. Id. at 2479 n. 18.
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B. Cases from Fifth
Annual Survey 10th Circuit Certiorari Denied
Alden v. Ryan
Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co.
Celebrity Inc. v. A & B Instru-
ment Co.
Farmers Alliance Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Jones
Furedy v. Appleman (In re Vodeo
Volume Development Co.)
Globe Construction Co. v.
Oklahoma City Housing Au-
thority
McDaniel v. State
Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darko
United States v. Austin
United States v. Black
United States v. Carleo
United States v. Fritz
United States v. Grismore
United States v. Haro
United States v. Lamb
United States v. McCoy
United States v. Nelson
United States v. Oakes
United States v. Rumpf
United States v. Shovea
United States v. Thomas
United States v. Thompson
571 F.2d 1159 (1978)
561 F.2d 1365 (1977)
573 F.2d 11 (1978)
570 F.2d 1384 (1978)
567 F.2d 967 (1977)
571 F.2d 1140 (1978)
582 F.2d 1242 (1978)
565 F.2d 1150 (1977)
462 F.2d 724 (1972)
569 F.2d 1111 (1978)
576 F.2d 846 (1978)
580 F.2d 370 (1978)
564 F.2d 929 (1977)
573 F.2d 661 (1978)
575 F.2d 1310 (1978)
573 F.2d 14 (1978)
582 F.2d 1246 (1978)
564 F.2d 384 (1977)
576 F.2d 818 (1978)
580 F.2d 1382 (1978)
580 F.2d 1036 (1978)
579 F.2d 1184 (1978)
439 U.S. 860 (1978)
434 U.S. 1052 (1978)
(cert. dwsrsed)
439 U.S. 824 (1978)
439 U.S. 825 (1978)
439 U.S. 806 (1978)





439 U.S. 969 (1978)
435 U.S. 1006 (1978)
409 U.S. 1048 (1972)
435 U.S. 944 (1978)
439 U.S. 850 (1978)
439 U.S. 947 (1978)
435 U.S. 954 (1978)
439 U.S. 851 (1978)
439 U.S. 854 (1978) (sub
nom. Clary v. United
States)
436 U.S. 958 (1978)
439 U..S. 1079 (1979)
435 U.S. 926 (1978)
439 U.S. 893 (1978)
440 U.S. 908 (1979)
439 U.S. 1130 (1979)
439 U.S. 896 (1978)
Further Developments:
Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Andrus v. Utah, 99 S. Ct.
2857 (1979).
NLRB v. Nat'l Jewish Hosp. & Research Center, 583 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1978), vacatedmem., 99 S.
Ct. 3094 (1979). The judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the Tenth Circuit for
further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision, NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 99 S.
Ct. 2598 (1979).
United States v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1978), vacated mem., 439 U.S. 1061 (1979). The
judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
indictment, Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist dissenting.
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